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Economic Experimental Games (EEG) have challenged the theoretical prediction showing 
that individuals balance own and collective interests when making decisions that deviate 
away  from  suboptimal  Nash  equilibrium.  However,  few  studies  have  analyzed  whether 
these deviations from Nash equilibrium towards social optimum are affected as the stock 
of  resource  changes.  Performing  EEG  with  real  fishers  we  test  the  hypothesis  that 
behavior of participants –measured as relative deviations from Nash equilibrium- differs 
under a situation of abundance versus a situation of scarcity. The design of our EEG is 
based on a profit maximization model that incorporates intertemporal effects of aggregated 
extraction.  Our  findings  show  that  in  a  situation  of  scarcity  players  over  extract  the 
resource making decisions above the Nash equilibrium, obtaining less profit, mining the 
others-regarding  interest,  and  exacerbating  the  tragedy  of  the  commons.  This  result 
challenges  previous  general  findings  from  the  EEG  literature.  When  individuals  face 
abundance of the resource, however, they deviate downward from the individualistic and 
myopic  behavior  prediction.  This  phenomenon  of  private  inefficient  over  exploitation  is 
corrected when management strategies are introduced in the game, which underlines the 
importance of institutions. 2 
 
1  Introduction 
 
Fisheries are the typical case of common-pool resources (CPR), in which the impossibility 
of exclusion and users’ rivalry result in their degradation and depletion. To this respect, 
Gordon (1954) argued that resources that are considered “free”, specifically fish, would not 
be extracted at its proper time since, for fishermen, fish in the sea are valueless as there is 
no guarantee to find them in the future if they are not extracted today. More than ten years 
later, Hardin (1968) used the expression “the tragedy of the commons” to describe the 
overuse and consequent depletion and exhaustion to which CPR would arrive as a result 
of the individualistic behavior of resource users. Since 1968, the tragedy of the commons 
has  been  used  to  describe  and  explain  several  situations  related  with  CPR  and 
environmental degradation. 
Conflicts associated with CPR have been widely studied in the economic literature 
including  game  theory  and  behavioral  and  experimental  economics.  In  particular,  the 
tragedy of the commons has been formalized using non cooperative game theory in which 
communication among players is not allowed and all players have complete information 
about the payoffs associated with their decisions (Dawes 1973, 1975 in Ostrom, 1990). 
Prediction from non-cooperative game theory establishes that in a CPR situation, players 
selecting their best individual strategies will not reach a Pareto-optimal outcome and that 
individual rational decisions from players will lead them to outcomes that are collectively 
irrational;  paradox  known  as  the  prisoner’s  dilemma  (Ostrom,  1990).  In  other  words, 
individuals facing CPR dilemmas will make decisions that lead them to a suboptimal Nash 
equilibrium, instead of pursuing strategies leading to a social optimum (Cardenas, Ahn, & 
Ostrom, 2003). 3 
 
In the case of fisheries, the tragedy of the commons and prisoner dilemma paradox 
can be observed when fishermen make individual extraction decisions that lead them to 
reach collectively a steady state characterized by excessive harvest effort, low availability, 
low catch per unit of effort, and null benefits. 
  Evidence from economic experimental games has challenged the above theoretical 
prediction  showing  that  individuals  may  deviate  from  Nash  equilibrium  towards  social 
optimum (Ostrom & Walker 1991), making CPR extraction decisions that balance own and 
collective interest (Davis & Holt 1993, Kagel & Roth 1995, Cardenas 2004), even when 
they  are  not  allowed  to  communicate  (Cardenas,  2000;  Cardenas,  Stranlund  &  Willlis, 
2000). For example, in experimental games conducted in three rural villages in Colombia, 
Cardenas et al. (2000) calculated individual deviations from Nash strategies to analyze the 
balance  between  self-regarding  and  others-regarding  behavior  and  found  that  when 
individuals  are  not  subject  to  any  rule,  their  decisions  are  neither  Nash  strategies  nor 
social optimal but something between these two outcomes. In addition, when individuals 
faced internal regulation, through communication, their decisions were collectively superior 
being  closer  to  socially  efficient  choices  and  moving  further  away  their  private  Nash 
equilibrium  (Cardenas,  Stranlund  and  Willlis,  2000).  Cardenas  (2000)  presents  similar 
findings relative to Nash deviations. 
  Despite of the abundant literature on those issues, few studies using economic 
experimental games (EEG) have included the inter temporal effects associated with CPR; 
In addition, those studies have not analyzed whether deviations from Nash equilibrium are 
affected by changes in the stock of the resource as a result of extraction decisions.  
  Dynamic effects may exacerbate CPR problems as individuals might not consider 
the full impact of their current decisions about extraction on their own and others future 
extraction  costs.  Herr  et  al.  (1997)  used  laboratory  experiments  to  analyze  time-4 
 
independent and time-dependent externalities in non-renewable commons and found that 
individuals’  myopic  behavior  not  only  exacerbates  CPR  problem,  but  also  that  even 
individuals who take into account current and future effects of their extraction decisions 
might enter into a race for resources, if they believe others may be acting myopically. Herr 
et  al.  (1997)  state  that  when  inter-temporal  effects  (time  dependent  externalities)  are 
included in a CPR experimental game, efficiency from the use of the resource will be lower 
than that obtained in a similar time-independent game. In addition, those authors show 
that in practice the efficiency in a time dependent game is even lower than that predicted 
in  theory  because  of temporally  myopic  behavior  that  is  present  only  when  time  is  an 
ingredient of the game, making the solution process more difficult. 
  The hypothesis that tragedy of commons might be intensified has been analyzed 
by Corners & Sandler (1983) in a static framework. These authors analyze the role of non-
zero conjectural variations on hybrid behavior of fishers. Corners & Sandler (1983) define 
hybrid behavior as “the maximizing behavior predicated on conjectures that one exploiter 
holds with respect to the way in which the other exploiters will respond to his own fishing 
efforts”. They argue that those conjectures are absent in standard CPR models and that 
under the presence of non-zero conjectural variation about what one exploiter thinks will 
be the effect of his extraction on the others extraction efforts, individuals responses will 
deviate  negatively  or  positively  from  Nash  equilibrium.  To  include  conjectures,  authors 
make  firm’s  benefits  dependent  on  –in  addition  to  own  firm’s  fleet  size-  the  expected 
response (hybrid behavior) about the size of industry fleet, which is taken as given in the 
standard model. As a result, if conjectures are positive, meaning that firm’s own increased 
fishing effort is expected to induce other firms to follow, the optimal fleet of the firm and the 
tragedy of commons will be less than that predicted by the standard solution. In contrast, 
under the presence of negative conjectures, the optimal fleet size of the firm will be greater 5 
 
than the Nash prediction and “the tragedy of the commons is intensified”. In the later case, 
the  Nash  equilibrium  represents  a  less  pessimistic  prediction  about  exploitation  of 
resources (Corners & Sandler, 1983). 
  Corners & Sandler’s (1983) paper leads us to another issue related to CPR games 
that has also been scarcely analyzed: CPR game responses above Nash equilibrium. In a 
CPR  experimental  game,  individuals  have  to  choose  their  level  of  extraction  from  an 
established range. The Nash equilibrium determines the private efficient level of extraction. 
Deviations  below  Nash  equilibrium  might  be  reflecting  collective  behavior  or  other-
regarding preferences as they might be incorporating collective interests in their individual 
extraction  decisions.  That  is,  individuals  do  not  necessarily  play  purely  self  interested 
strategies, as predicted by theory (Cardenas et al., 2002). Conversely, when individuals 
extract  more  units  than  those  predicted  as  the  Nash  strategy  –deviation  above  Nash 
equilibrium-  the  conclusion  is  that  they  are  being  very  inefficient  as  they  are  making 
decisions that affect their own private returns.  
Although, in general, findings from experimental games show that individuals tend 
to deviate more towards socially efficient outcomes than towards privately inefficient ones, 
literature  that  analyzes  this  later  behavior  is  scarce,  at  least  in  the  case  of  CPR 
experimental games. Cardenas et al. (2002) explore the role of economic inequality in the 
“provision” of local environmental quality performing experimental games in rural villages 
in Colombia. In the experimental game, individuals had to choose the number of days they 
will  spend  collecting  firewood  from  forest  and  the  number  of  days  they  will  spent  in 
alternative market activities. In order to analyze the role of economic heterogeneity, these 
authors test two treatments: in the first treatment, individuals in a group face symmetric 
returns to the alternative market while in the second treatment (asymmetric game), players 
face different returns to market options (high wage players and low  wage players). Of 6 
 
interest,  for  our  discussion  here,  is  that  although  individual  Nash  equilibrium  in  the 
symmetric treatment is also symmetric, the Nash equilibriums of the asymmetric game 
vary: the players with more valuable alternative market activities (high-wage players) are 
predicted to spend fewer days exploiting the local forest compared with low-wage players. 
Surprisingly, authors find that during the first five rounds of the first phase of the game (no 
rules  applied),  the  average  deviations  from  best-responses  of  high-wage  players  are 
negative, indicating that high wage players spend more time collecting firewood than what 
is  privately  optimal.  Authors  conclude that  these  decisions  are  very  inefficient  not  only 
because  they  are  not  optimal  in  the  private  sense  but  also  because  they  are  “more 
environmentally damaging than their Nash strategies” (Cardenas et al, 2002). 
  Some  studies  have  analyzed  the  private  inefficiency  associated  to  individuals’ 
under-contribution in public-good games, which, in the mirror case of CPR games would 
be  over-extraction  or  over  exploitation  decisions  (deviations  above  Nash-predicted 
equilibrium).  In  linear  public-good  games,  the  maximizing  private  benefit  strategy  (the 
predicted Nash equilibrium) is to allocate zero units to the public good and all of them to 
the  private  activity.  However,  findings  from  experimental  games  contradict  these 
theoretical predictions as individuals tend to make important contributions to the public 
good or activity. This finding is robust among treatments where linear game designs do not 
allow for negative contributions. To analyze the possibility of under-contribution in public 
game experiments (deviations below Nash equilibrium), some authors have modified the 
payoff  structure  to  allow  for  interior  solutions  –or  partial  contributions-,  defining  payoff 
functions that are non-linear either in the private or in the public good (Keser, 1996; van 
Dijk & van Winden, 1997, Isaac & Walker, 1998; Willinger & Ziegelmeyer, 2001). Findings 
from those studies have been ambiguous: while Isaac and Walker (1998), assuming a non 
linear pay off structure in the public good, find that over-contribution is not significant for 7 
 
high  levels  of  equilibrium  contribution  and,  as  opposite,  individuals  tend  to  under-
contribute, Keser (1996) and van Dijk (1997), assuming non linear payoff functions in the 
private good, found that over contribution is significant.  
  Literature appears to support the idea that the level of the predicted equilibrium 
contribution plays an important role in contribution decisions and affects the existence of 
under contribution as well as its magnitude. Willinger & Ziegelmeyer (2001) analyze the 
strength  of  the  social  dilemma  on  the  contribution  behavior,  testing  four  levels  of 
equilibrium (low, medium, high, and very high) and assuming a quadratic payoff structure 
in  the  private  good,  where  the  dominant  equilibrium  is  a  unique  interior  solution.  The 
authors reduce the strength of the social dilemma by moving the equilibrium contribution to 
the social optimum and find that over-contribution was only significant at the low level of 
equilibrium contribution, confirming Isaac and Walker’s (1998) findings, which show that 
average  over  contribution  is  reduced  when  equilibrium  level  moves  towards  Pareto 
optimum.  
  Despite  of  having  similar  findings  about  over  contribution  with  Willinger  and 
Ziegelmeyer’s  (2001),  Isaac  and  Walker  (1998)  find  that  subjects  do  tend  to  under 
contribute  when  facing  high  levels  of  equilibrium  contribution.  Specifically,  Isaac  and 
Walker  (1998)  evaluate  Nash  deviations  testing  four  treatments:  the  first,  based  on  a 
boundary Nash solution and the other three, based on interior Nash equilibriums at three 
different levels. Under-contribution was present in results: in treatments exhibiting the two 
highest levels of Nash equilibriums, average investments in the public good are below the 
Nash  prediction,  being  this  finding  more  pronounced  in  the  overall  highest  equilibrium 
level. However, under contribution was not observed neither in the treatment based on the 
corner solution nor in the treatment where the interior solution corresponds to the lowest 
equilibrium level tested. It is important to bring to this discussion some results from the 8 
 
authors’ analyses on individual mean investments: they found that in the highest predicted 
Nash  equilibrium  treatment,  41  percent  of  subjects’  mean  investments  in  the  group 
deviated up the Nash equilibrium and that the percentage of subjects always investing 
above  the  Nash  equilibrium,  for  the  same  treatment,  was  27  percent.  These  findings 
suggest  that  “within  the  same  experimental  group,  some  individuals  follow  investment 
strategies that are highly ‘cooperative’ while others follow strong ‘free riding’ strategies, 
which might be explaining the under contribution observed in the treatments with highest 
predicted equilibrium levels.” Another important finding from Isaac and Walker (1998) is 
that upward and downward biases are not the result of pure error.  
  In the real world, private inefficiency as well as the hypothesis of the possibility of 
exacerbation  of  tragedy  of  commons  may  be  reflecting  what  is  known  as  Malthusian 
overfishing. This expression was introduced by Pauly (1988, 1990) to describe the over-
exploitation  of  fisheries  by  poor  artisanal  fishers  in  an  effort  to  maintain  their  income, 
leading to a spiral of destruction of marine resources, declining extraction and increasing 
poverty  (Teh  &  Sumaila,  2006).  Malthusian  over-fishing  concept  includes  that  over 
exploitation of fisheries that is characterized by three elements: i) poverty, ii) population 
growth  and  ii)  rigidity  in  income-generating  activities  (Teh  &  Sumaila,  2006).  Although 
degradation  of fisheries  as  a  CPR  has  explanations  on  their  own  characteristics  (non-
excludability and rivalry), it might be exacerbated when Malthusian over fishing conditions 
are present and resource is being depleted and becoming scarce. In developing tropical 
countries,  fisherman  communities  are  characterized  by  low  incomes,  low  levels  of 
education, the use of non-appropriate (neither permitted) fishing methods, and rigidities in 
labor  and  capital  markets  that  impede  them  to  pursuit  other  income-generating 
alternatives, making the case of Malthusian overfishing an explanation of their behavior.  9 
 
Given  the  previous  review  of  the state  of  the art,  which  approaches  social  and 
private inefficiency in the use of public goods and common-pool resources, we address 
our contribution to test the following hypothesis: in dilemmas associated with the use of a 
CPR,  specifically  fisheries,  individuals  that  face  abundance  of  the  resource  tend  to 
cooperate (under-extract), even where no rules are applied; however, individuals reduce 
cooperation and might even be privately inefficient when they face scarcity of the resource, 
moving into a race to the bottom in the extraction-profit pattern. This hypothesis could be 
seen in other terms: the social dilemma associated with the use of CPR becomes weaker 
as  the  private  maximizing-solution  level  is  moved  towards  the  social  (Pareto  optimal) 
solution, where the lower level of Nash equilibrium is the result of changes in the stock of 
the resource. 
  Based on this hypothesis, the objective of this paper is to investigate, performing 
EEG with real fishers, how the behavior of agents facing CPR dilemmas –measured as 
relative deviations from Nash equilibrium-, differs under two scenarios: abundance and 
scarcity of the resource, which in turn are the result of the aggregated extraction decisions.  
  If  our  hypothesis  is  tested  and  accepted,  those  results  would  imply  that  under 
scarcity (low availability of the resource) individuals will tend to over extract the resource, 
even if this is an inefficient behavior, implying over effort and higher pressure on ecological 
systems. In that case, the tragedy of the commons would be exacerbated. 
  The paper is organized as follows: in the second part we describe the theoretical 
model that support the analyzes, in third section we will explain how we develop economic 
experimental game in eight communities habiting in the influence zone of a national 
natural park in Colombia, to arrive to the fourth section, in which we will present and 
discuss the main results; and finally, in the last section some implications and preliminary 
conclusions are exposed.  10 
 
2  Theoretical model 
 
 To  accomplish  our  objective,  we  adopt  the  dynamic  model  of  profit  maximization 
postulated by Moreno & Maldonado (2008), which not only captures the social dilemma of 
common  pool  resources,  but  also  incorporates  intertemporal  effects  of  aggregated 
extraction. 
  The model is based on an individual fisher benefit function which is non-linear in 
both the level of private extraction (x) and the level of resource stock (S). The benefits 
(and costs) that he/she obtains from the extraction activity are, in turn, divided in two parts: 
i) the private benefit f(.) that depends on the level of extraction (x) but whose costs depend 
on the availability of the resource (S), and ii) the collective benefits or costs g(.), that are 
the result of extraction decisions make by all the fishers using the resource and that affect 
the  availability  for  other  fishers
1.  This  benefit  function  represents  the  profits  from  a 
common-pool  resource  (CPR)  characterized  by  non  exclusion  and  rivalry  when  fishers 
decide to extract fish:  
) (
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where  0 , 0 , 0 ≥ ≥ > γ β α  are parameters.  t i, π indicates the benefits that fisher i obtains in 
period t from extracting the resource. The private part of benefits, f(.), is assumed to be a 
quadratic  function  of  extraction,  in  order  to  capture  decreasing  marginal  benefits  of 
extracting, and non-linear in the stock of the resource, assuming reserve-dependent cost 
(cost increases with reduction in stock but not linearly). Function f(.) represents a profit 
function  whose  revenues  depend  on  a  parameter  α (the  price  of  the  resource  in  the 
market)  and  whose  costs  depend  directly  on  extraction  and  inversely  on  stock.  The 
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collective part of benefit, the function g(.), is assumed to be linear in the level of extraction; 
function g(.) represents the effect of joint extraction on individual benefits: the parameter e 
represents the maximum amount that each fisher can extract, which is assumed equal for 
all  fishermen  and  that,  aggregated  for  n  fishers  –ne-,  reflects  the  availability  of  the 







−   shows  the 
availability of the resource after extraction done by n fishermen, while the parameter γ, 
represents the proportion in which this common-pool resource availability affects individual 
benefits (Moreno & Maldonado, 2008).  
  On the other hand, the resource stock changes according to the evolution equation 
in expression (2): 
  ∑
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The evolution equation states that the amount of the resource in period t+1 will 
equal the stock at the beginning of period t, minus the extraction of all fishers during that 
period, plus the net growth function –that in this case depends on the parameters  θ  and 
K
2. 
  Following  Moreno  &  Maldonado  (2008),  the  Nash  equilibrium  of  this  model  is 
obtained by the maximization of each fisher’s benefits through time subject to the evolution 
equation: 
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  This expression represents the Nash equilibrium for the game and shows that the 
optimum private extraction depends positively on the stock and the parameter α (the price 
                                                           
2 The growth function can be assumed as a logistic function where the parameter θ represents the implicit 
growth rate and the parameter K, the carrying capacity of the resource. 12 
 
of the resource), and negatively on the parameter associated to costs of extraction (β), the 
impact of aggregated extraction (γ) and the discounted inter-temporal price of the stock of 
the resource (δλt+1).  
To obtain the level of extraction that maximizes the social welfare, a central planner 
would aggregate the benefits of all individuals, in this case the n fishermen, subject to the 
evolution equation of the stock (Moreno & Maldonado, 2008): 
∑
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
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The  Pareto  optimum  resulting  from  the  first  order  condition  with  respect  to  the 
extraction would be: 





x δλ γ α
β
.                (5) 
Expression (5) shows that the social level of extraction must be lower than that in 
expression (3), as the proportion in which the availability of CPR affects benefits (γ) must 
be  aggregated  for  the  total  number  of  fishers  -n-  in  order  to  capture  the  full  costs  of 
extraction decisions (Moreno & Maldonado, 2008). 
This  model,  therefore,  shows  that  private  extraction  decisions  should  differ  from 
social optimum decisions and that they can range on an ample spectrum depending on the 
value  of  parameters  and,  particularly,  on  the  level  of  stock.  Lower  levels  of  resource 




3  Empirical Model 
 
Model simulation and pay-off structure 
With the purpose of constructing a pay-off structure that recreates the conflict between 
collective and private interests represented in expression (1), Moreno & Maldonado (2008) 
assigned specific values to the parameters in expressions (3) and (5). The parameters 
used are: α = 100; β = 800; γ = 20. In addition, authors choose the range of plausible 
extraction equal to [1, 8] and e = 8, following previous field experiments conducted by 
Cardenas (2004). 
The dynamic model proposed by Moreno & Maldonado (2008), where changes in 
stock  affect  individual  benefits,  yields  many  (and  unmanageable  in  practice)  Nash 
equilibriums for each level of stock resulting from each possible aggregated extraction. In 
order  to  make  the  game  practical,  easy  and  understandable  for  real  fishers,  the 
researchers simulated solutions for only two levels of stock: high level (abundance) and 
low level (scarcity), making necessary to construct just two payoff tables, one for each of 
these stock levels. The pay-off tables show the benefits that each individual obtains from 
different  combinations  of  individual  and  aggregated  extraction  (annex  1).  From  these 
payoff tables it is possible to observe that as individual i increase his/her extraction, his/her 
payoffs  increase  (at  a  decreasing  rate),  but  as  the  aggregate  extraction  increases,  i´s 
payoffs decrease, which emulates the social dilemma between individual and collective 
interests. 
Notice that the dynamic setting of the model generates two implications on player’s 
decisions: First, the effect of aggregated extraction in period t on resource stock at period 
t+1, and second, the effect of the inter-temporal discount rate on the individual path of 
extraction decisions. Therefore, even assuming just to levels of stock, the model still would 
yield several private Nash equilibriums, depending on the individual´s discount rate. If we 14 
 
assume  that  the  player  does  not  take  into  account  the  inter-temporal  effects  of  her 
decisions, the model predicts that in her private extraction decision the term δλ converges 
to zero
3; then expression (5) becomes: 






x .                  (6) 
Expression  (6)  is  equivalent  to  a  myopic  Nash  equilibrium  and  we  used  it  to 
calculate the theoretical benchmarks and payoff tables used in the experiment. Utilizing 
parameters mentioned above and assuming stock under abundance SH = 80, we arrive to 
a  Nash  equilibrium  of  8  units,  which  is  a  corner  solution  as  the  range  of  plausible 
extraction is [1,8]. In order to simulate scarcity of the resource (low level of stock) we 
assume SL = 40
4 and, ceteris paribus, we obtain a Nash equilibrium –under low stock- of 4 
units, which corresponds to an interior solution. Notice that although under scarcity of the 
resource, Nash equilibrium is four units, individuals could still extract any amount between 
one and eight units. So, in this case, players may deviate from Nash Equilibrium not only 
downward but also upward. Given that cost function is reserve-dependent, benefits under 
abundance  are  higher  than  those  under  scarcity,  at  each  level  of  extraction.  Figure  1 
illustrates average benefits a player can obtain under the two states. 
In addition to myopic Nash equilibriums –low and high-, other private solutions can 
be obtained from this model if it is assumed that individual deviate in different degrees 
from that complete myopic behavior. Gillet et al (2007) incorporate inter temporal effects in 
lab  experiments  by  simulating  two  extreme  scenarios:  optimal  forward  looking,  where 
individuals  incorporate  completely  future  effects  on  current  decisions,  and  myopic 
behavior,  where  players  maximize  current  period  benefits  in  each  and  every  period, 
without taking future consequences into account. Our assumption is similar to Gillet et al 
                                                           
3 This is equivalent to a discount rate (ρ) converging to infinite. 
4 We performed games with groups of five players. Notice that a level of stock equal to 40 units allows each of 
the five players to extract the maximum eight units of the resource. 15 
 
(2007), but we do not define an optimal-forward looking (or complete-forward lookingness) 
scenario, where player has perfect forecast of future implication of current actions on total 
current and future benefits. Instead, we assume that any deviation from complete myopic 
behavior  incorporate  some  kind  of  forward-looking  behavior.  In  this  way,  Table  1 
summarizes the equilibriums for the model. 
 
 
Figure 1. Average payoffs obtained by players under different resource stocks. 
 
Deviations  below  Nash  equilibriums  imply  that  individuals  either  incorporate 
collective interest in individual decisions or incorporate future consequences of present 
actions on current decisions, or both. In the case of low stock, deviations above Nash 
imply private and social inefficiency, as individuals would be making extraction decisions 
that represent less benefits than those associated with Nash equilibrium (less extraction) 
and they would be acting more resource-harmful than what theory predicts, exacerbating 




























Finally, using the same parameters, Moreno and Maldonado (2008) adjusted the 
social optimum equal to one unit
5 which will be also used for our analyses.  
 
Table 1. Nash equilibriums for the model.  
Stock level/ discount rate 
Complete myopic behavior 
∞ → ρ 0 = ∂ ⇒  
Forward looking 
1 0 < ∂ <  
High (abundance of the resource)  8  < 8 
Low (scarcity of the resource)  4  < 4 
 
Experimental design 
Based on the theoretical model, we design a CPR economic experimental game (EEG) in 
two phases, both of them made up by ten rounds of decisions. Individuals were organized 
in groups of five participants and at every round, each player must decide privately a level 
of extraction from one to eight units of the resource. Player’s extraction decisions generate 
points, convertible into monetary units. On average US$ 50 were paid per group of players 
(US$ 10 /person, which is equivalent to a typical daily wage/person in the region). Pay-off 
tables (annex 1) reflect equation (1): the higher the individual extraction, the higher the 
points a player obtains, but a decreasing rate. However, the higher the group extraction 
the lower the points an individual obtains for each extracted unit.  
The  inter-temporal  effect  of  aggregated  extraction  is  captured  by  the  fact  that 
group’s extraction in one period will affect stock level in the following period. For simplicity, 
in  our  design  individuals  could  arrive  just  at  two  different  stock  levels:  high  level  or 
                                                           
5 Although parameters generate a theoretical social optimum of zero units, we followed Cardenas (2004), who 
argues that it is convenient to eliminate the zero extraction option to avoid conflicts in conducting experiments 
that arise because there is strong aversion by villagers towards prohibitions to use resources. In addition, in 
the NNP-CRSB fishermen are allowed to extract resources for “self-consumption”. 17 
 
abundance  and  low  level  or  scarcity.  In  practice,  the  dynamic  part  of  the  game  was 
designed as follows: if in round t the aggregated extraction (five-person group extraction) 
exceeded 20 units, in next round (round t+1) individual will face scarcity of the resource 
(low availability). Under scarcity, every unit of extraction is paid with fewer points as low 
availability of the resource implies more effort per unit of catch, which in turn generates, 
ceteris paribus, lower benefits. Conversely, if the extraction by the whole group in period t 
was less than or equal to 20 units, players in period t+1 will face an abundant resource 
(high availability), which requires less effort per unit of catch, and so higher returns to the 
activity.  These  two  levels  of  stock  are  associated  with  two  different  pay-off  tables 
according with the benefit function in expression (1). 
During first  phase  individuals  did  not  face  any  rule  while  during  second  phase, 
players  face  three  different  rules:  internal  regulation,  external  regulation,  and  a 
combination  of  both.  Analysis  of  management  rules  were  carried  out  in  Moreno  & 
Maldonado  (2008)  and  therefore  this  paper  will  not  address  the  issues  related  with 
performance of rules independently but jointly in order to concentrate analysis efforts on 
the  over  extraction  hypothesis.  Figure  2  shows  the  dynamic  components  of  the 
experiment.  
Recall  that  according  to  the  profit  maximization  model,  the  expected  Nash 
equilibrium  of  the  game  under  abundance  (scarcity)  and  assuming  completely  myopic 
behavior is a level of aggregated extraction of 40 units (20 units), implying 8 units per 
player under high stock and 4 units per player under low stock. The social optimum is a 




Figure 2. Dynamic components of economic experimental games  
 
The players  
Economic experimental games were performed with 230 individuals from eight fisherman 
communities  located  in  the  influence  zone  of  the  National  Natural  Park  Corales  del 
Rosario y San Bernardo (NNP-CRSB) in the Colombian Caribbean. 
 
Operative procedures 
 As mentioned above, at every location fishers were organized in groups of five individuals 
and seated back to back in order to guarantee anonymity and confidentiality of individual 
decisions.  In  addition,  a  supervisor  monitored  and  controlled  that  games  rules  were 
understood and accomplished. The supervisor was also in charge of collecting pieces of 
paper  (decision  cards)  where  fishermen  wrote  extraction  decisions  that  they  privately 
made at every decision round.  
On the other hand, before starting the game, experts on environmental education 
with communities explained the game to the fishermen using different visual aids such as 
Beginning of round  • Each player can extract from 1 to 8 units
•The group can extract from 5 to 40 units
If group extraction < = 20 units,
then: next round agents will face 
abundance or  high availability 
of the resource
If group extraction > 20 units, then:
next round agents will face scarcity 
or low availability of the resource
Pay-off table= high Pay-off table = low
End of the round19 
 
drawings, pictures and posters. As a complement and in order to guarantee individuals 
had understood the game, we performed three practice rounds before starting the actual 
game. 
Every player received the following material for the game: i) decision cards, where 
they write their individual and confidential extraction decision, ii) Scarcity pay-off table, iii) 
Abundance pay-off table, and iv) Individual accounting sheet.  
4  Analytical methods and results 
 
In order to analyze the behavior of participants in the EEG and to address the research 
question, the methodological approach proposed is based on some basic steps: 
1.  To analyze the frequency of individual extraction decisions and deviations from Nash 
at every resource state and to classify those decisions according to their relationship 
with theoretically predicted equilibriums. The differences are tested statistically. From 
this  analysis,  we  look  for  patterns  on  decisions  that  help  to  explain  the  behavior, 
particularly  when  players  decided  to  extract  above  Nash  equilibrium.  Categories  of 
individual behaviors are drawn from this analysis. 
2.  To  analyze  the  frequency  of  group  extraction  decisions  and  deviations  from  Nash 
equilibriums at every resource state, classify these decisions and test statistically the 
differences. Similar to individual decisions, to search for patterns on group decisions, 
especially when these decisions fall above Nash equilibriums. Categories of groups 
are also constructed. 
3.  To look for relationships between individual behavior and group behavior to analyze 
the patterns of extraction and the effect that groups can have on individuals. 20 
 
4.  To run a preliminary econometric model to explain differences in extraction decisions 
and deviations from Nash as a function of socioeconomic, resource state, among other 
variables. 
5.  To analyze how rules included in the EEG alter individuals’ behavior. 
 
Individual decisions 
The first step is to analyze the frequency of extraction decisions at every state. Figure 3 
shows that under high stock is more frequent to observe extraction decisions of more than 
five units, and that 8-unit extraction is the most frequent decision. However, in the same 
figure  it  is  observed  that  when  players  faced  scarcity,  extraction  distribution  is  more 
uniform along the whole range of extraction possibilities. Given that Nash equilibrium at 
low stock is interior, at this level there are extractions that should not be observed (those 
colored in red in the graph), as they are decisions that generate lower benefits than those 
obtained at a level of extraction of four units. So, these extractions are inefficient both 
privately  and  socially,  as  resource  is  being  overexploited  without  any  marginal  benefit 
(even with a marginal loss). From this figure, it also can be deducted that most of rounds 
(60 percent) occurred at low level of stock (blue and red bars), while 40 percent of rounds 
are  played  at  high  level  (green  bars).  From  all  the  rounds,  15  percent  of  decisions 
coincided with Nash equilibriums, 46 percent were below Nash equilibrium, 27 percent 
were inefficient (above Nash equilibrium), and 10 percent at optimum (socially) levels. 21 
 
 
Figure 3. Frequency of different extraction decisions at high and low stock. 
 
Recall that Nash equilibrium at low stock equals four units, while under high stock it 
equals eight units. In order to compare extraction decisions under the two levels of stock, 
we  calculated  the  difference  between  actual  extraction  and  expected  private  Nash 
equilibrium.  This  measure  is  what  we  call  deviations  from  Nash.  If  individuals  extract 
above  the  Nash  equilibrium  –inefficient  and  exacerbating  extraction-  the  deviation  is  a 
negative number; if they extract below Nash –others-regarding preferences- the deviation 
is a positive number; and if they extract at Nash equilibrium –privately efficient decision- 
the number is zero. Figure 4 shows those deviations and their frequency at both high and 
low stocks. Since deviations are calculated with respect to different Nash equilibriums, 
signs of absolute deviations are more important than magnitudes for analytical purposes. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Low stock 202 241 233 232 195 191 164 212
























Frequency of extractions22 
 
 
Figure 4. Deviations from Nash at every state of the resource. 
 
These deviations are classified in groups according to their relationship with Nash 
private decisions: Figure 5 shows that under high stock, 83 percent of decisions  were 
below  Nash,  implying  either  others-regarding  preferences  or  forward  looking  behavior. 
When facing low stock, 86 percent of decisions were made out of Nash equilibriums, but 
only  40%  of  them  were  below  Nash,  implying  lower  others-regarding  preferences  or 
forward looking behavior.  
 
 

















Deviation from Nash equilibirum








Low stock 46% 14% 40% 12% 86%







Deviations from Nash equilibrium23 
 
At high stock, 17 percent of decisions were done at the Nash equilibrium (x = 8), 
while 6 percent of them were observed at the social optimum (x = 1). On the other hand, at 
low stock 14 percent of decisions coincided with Nash equilibrium (x = 4), and 12 percent 
were  observed  at  the  social  optimum.  Besides,  at  low  stock  was  possible  to  observe 
decisions above Nash: 46 percent of the total decisions under that stock availability were 
made above private Nash equilibrium, and obviously above the social optimum. 
In  summary,  when  facing  scarcity  individuals  tended  to  extract  using  inefficient 
strategies  in  almost  half  of  the  rounds,  exacerbating  the  tragedy  of  the  commons  by 
extracting not only more than the social optimum but also more than the private Nash 
equilibrium. 
Those findings would lead to several implications of importance: 
-  When scarcity appears, collective action or forward lookingness is reduced; 
-  The greater the “distance” between Nash equilibrium and the social optimum, the 
less likely players arrive to the optimum. Under low stock, players’ Nash is closer to 
the social optimum, so they are more likely to make optimum decisions; and 
-  A central result: under low stock, players decided to over extract in 46% of the 
rounds,  even  knowing  that  this  is  an  inefficient  behavior  in  terms  of  over  effort 
(private) and impact on the resource (social). 
These  results  coincide  with  some  economic  literature  using  models  with  interior 
solutions,  which  have  found  that  individuals  could  deviate  up  or  down  from  Nash 
equilibriums, particularly in the case of public goods. Isaac and Walker (1998) show that at 
high  optimal  private  levels  of  contribution  to  a  public  good,  individuals  tend  to  under 
contribute even if this behavior is inefficient. Similarly to those authors, we have found, for 
the mirror case of a CPR, that in a situation of scarcity, players over extract the resource, 24 
 
making decisions above the Nash equilibrium, obtaining less profits, mining the others-
regarding interest, and exacerbating the tragedy of the commons. 
There is an interesting way of explaining this behavior: Small-scale fishers in tropical 
developing countries are usually poor and lack alternative employment opportunities, i.e. 
once  they  start  fishing  they  are  forced  to  continue,  even  if  the  resource  declines 
precipitously (Pauly, 1994). Malthusian overfishing is what occurs when these poor fishers, 
lacking the usual alternative of ‘traditional’ fishers (e.g. a small plot of land or seasonal 
work  on  nearby  farms  or  plantations),  are  faced  with  declining  catches  and  induce 
wholesale resource destruction in their effort to maintain their incomes (Pauly, 1994). 
  In order to validate these results, it is necessary to test statistically whether there 
are significant differences between decisions at different state levels; in this case, we have 
two resource stocks –low and high. Table 2 shows statistics in three variables: individual 
extraction decisions, individual deviations from Nash, and individual deviations from Nash 
as a fraction of theoretical Nash equilibrium. Statistical differences analysis is only valid for 
the later variable, as the other two are not comparable. Three statistical tests are used: 
First, a t-test on averages, assuming that variables are normally distributed. If there are no 
underlying  assumption  about  the  distribution  of  the  variables,  two  alternative  tests  are 
used: Mann Whitney test, which tests the null hypothesis that two independent samples 
are from populations with the same distribution (Wilcoxon rank-sum test); and Fisher’s test 
on median, which performs a nonparametric K-sample test on the equality of medians; it 











deviation from Nash 
Low stock  4.357  -0.357  -8.9% 
High stock  5.035  2.965  37.1% 
Difference      -46.0%*** 
Mann Whitney z      -20.98*** 
Prob(v1>v2)      0.268 
Fisher´s test (Pearson chi
2)    208.7*** 
* significant at 10%  ** significant at 5%  *** significant at 1% 
 
Under all tests, the differences between individual percent deviations from Nash 
under low and high states are highly statistically significant, showing that decisions under 
high stock differ systematically from those under low stock. Besides, it is observed that 
both mean and medians are different under both states and, as can be observed in the 
table, under low stock individuals over extract the resource. 
This behavior, however, may be associated to some particular individuals and not 
to the whole set of players. To test this hypothesis, we divided the sample according to the 
number  of  rounds  that  participants  played  above  the  Nash  equilibrium.  That  is,  we 
calculated the number of rounds that every participant played above Nash. In Figure 6 can 
be observed, for example, that 25 percent of players decided not to extract above the 
Nash during the whole 10 rounds, 14 percent of the players extracted above Nash one out 





Figure 6. Frequency associated to the number of rounds that individuals played above Nash 
 
Based  on  this  observation,  participants  were  categorized  depending  on  the 
average  number  of  rounds  that  they  decided  to  play  above  Nash:  some  never  played 
above Nash, some played less than half of the times above Nash, and some played more 
than half of the rounds above Nash. Results are presented in Figure 7. Results show that 
besides  the  one quarter  of  participants  that  never  played  above  Nash,  almost  another 
quarter played above Nash more than half of the rounds, and about a half of them played 
less than half of the times above Nash, but at least once. 
 
 





















































Those findings imply that, individually, some players may have pro-social attitudes 
(“good guys” in social and environmental sense), some may have individualistic attitudes, 
and some may have exacerbating attitudes, even if they are having economic losses by 
doing that (“bad guys” in social and environmental terms). 
A  further  question  is  whether  this  individual  behavior  is  influenced  by  group 
behavior. Therefore, a group analysis is performed. 
 
Group decisions 
Similar to the individual analysis, the first step is to observe whether group behavior differs 
depending on the state of the resource, comparing group extraction, group deviations from 
Nash (Group Nash equilibrium is 20 units under low stock and 40 units under high stock), 
and group deviation as a proportion of expected Nash. Results for these variables and 
statistics tests for the later variable are presented in Table 3; the group decisions vary 
significantly depending on the state of the resource, and they tend to deviate upward the 
Nash  equilibrium  when  group faces  low  availability  of  the  resource,  while  they  deviate 
downward the Nash equilibrium when stock is abundant. Under low stock, mean group 
extraction was about nine percent above the Nash equilibrium (20 units), while under high 
stock, mean group extraction was about 37 percent below Nash equilibrium (40 units). 
Similar to individual analysis, group behavior can be categorized according to their 
deviation about Nash. Categories for group deviations from Nash are presented in Figure 8: 
under low stock, 57% of the times, group decisions were made above the 20-unit group 
Nash equilibrium, 35 percent of the times below Nash equilibrium and only eight percent of 
the times at the Nash equilibrium of 20 units. Under high stock there were neither group 
decisions at 40 units (Nash equilibrium) nor group decisions at social optimum (five units). 
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Table 3. Statistical analysis of differences in group decisions at both levels of stock 




deviation from Nash 
Low stock  21.784  -1.784  -8.9% 
High stock  25.173  14.827  37.1% 
Difference      -46.0%*** 
Mann Whitney z      -37.35*** 
Prob(v1>v2)      0.085 
Fisher´s test (Pearson chi
2)    1,400.0*** 
* significant at 10%  ** significant at 5%  *** significant at 1% 
 
Under  low  stock  and  analyzing  the  data  from  the  group  perspective,  the 




Figure 8. Groups classification according to their deviation from Nash equilibrium 
 
In the same sense as in the individual case, the following question is whether this 










Low stock 57% 8% 35% 0% 92%








others tended to exacerbate. Therefore, groups are analyzed according to the number of 
rounds that they played above Nash. Results are presented in Figure 9: 23 percent of 
groups never played above Nash; that is, they consistently cooperate with the use of the 
resource. It is also notorious that 13 percent of groups played 9 out of the ten rounds 
above Nash equilibrium.  
 
 
Figure 9. Frequency associated to the number of rounds that groups played above Nash 
 
These behaviors are categorized to define attitudes of groups: some groups acted 
during this part of the game cooperatively and sustainably, as they never extracted above 
Nash,  some  others  moved  switching  between  decisions  above  and  below  Nash 
equilibriums, and some others most of the rounds played above Nash equilibrium. These 
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Figure 10. Categories of groups according to their behavior with respect to Nash equilibriums 
 
Three quarters of the groups played at least once above Nash equilibrium; about 
half of the groups played less than half of the rounds above Nash, and half of the groups 
played below the Nash equilibrium. Near one quarter of groups played never above Nash 
equilibrium. That is, some groups consistently behave cooperatively by never extracting 
above  Nash  (“good”  groups  in  social  and  environmental  terms);  some  groups  exhibit 
behaviors  closer  to  the  Nash  equilibrium,  and  some  groups  repeatedly  extract  in  an 
inefficient way (“bad” groups in social and environmental terms). 
 
Relationships between individual and group decisions 
Given that there are individuals that behave inefficiently along the game and individuals 
that exhibit pro-social behavior consistently along the game, and groups that show similar 
pattern, the question is whether “good guys” belong to “good” groups or not. In Figure 11 is 
observed  that  good  players  and  good  groups  coincide  in  a  high  proportion  of  rounds 
related with good groups; similarly, bad groups and bad guys coincide in more than 60 
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Figure  11.  Relationship  between  individual  and  group  decisions  with  respect  to  Nash 
equilibriums 
 
Interestingly,  25  percent  of  players  in  groups  that  exacerbate  the  use  of  the 
resource are “good guys”, in the sense that they made an effort for not over extracting the 
resource. They are consistently trying to reduce the group extraction, but their effort is 
vanished for the inefficient behavior of the rest of the group. As a result they fall in low 
stock most of the times, and their profits are reduced. Conversely, seven percent of the 
players  belonging  to  “good”  groups,  consistently  over  extract  during  the  game,  make 
profits  from  it,  and  the  pro-social  behavior  of  the  group  maintain  them  in  high  stock 
availability obtaining greater profits. They are free riders of the groups that maintain high 
resource availability by efficient and pro-social decisions made by the rest of the group. 
  Those free riders may erode the pro-social behavior and induce good players to 
start playing inefficiently. On the other hand, good players in bad groups may send signals 
–through their behavior- to the other players to reduce the over extraction. To analyze if 
these  cases  are  observed,  we  calculated  the  average  extraction  decisions  of  players 
categorized according to these three groups: pro-social or good guys, neutral or Nash 















that there is no clear evidence that behavior of individuals was affected by the behavior of 
the group, although for Nash guys (those that extract at least once above Nash equilibrium 
but less than half of the rounds) a reducing trend is evident. These results imply that pro-
social  players  behave  efficiently  independent  of  belonging  to  good  or  bad  groups;  the 
same, unfortunately, is true for inefficient players. 
 
  
Figure 12. Average extraction of individuals according to Nash categories 
 
Effect of rules on decisions 
The  second  part  of  the  game  involved  the  introduction  of  rules  aimed  to  increase  the 
collective  action  and  the  efficiency  in  the  behavior,  by  reducing  the  extraction  of  the 
resource and increasing the sustainability of it. These rules included external regulation 
(fines), internal regulation (communication), and a combination of them (co-management). 
It is not intended to present all the details of these treatments, as they are amply analyzed 
in Moreno & Maldonado (2008), but in general is observed that all of the rules are effective 
reducing extraction, although the effect depends greatly on the location of the community 



























  In Table 4 is shown that extraction reduced, in average, from 4.6 to 3.1 units, being 
more  significant  under  high  stock.  This  change  in  the  pattern  of  behavior  implied  that 
under abundance (high stock) players moved closer to the social optimum, by changing 
the deviation from Nash from 2.97 units to 5.02 when treatments are included.  
 
Table 4. Comparison of individual responses as a result of introduced rules 















Total  4.630  3.093  0.984  4.054  9.6%  52.0% 
Low stock  4.357  3.496  -0.357  0.504  -8.9%  12.6% 
High stock  5.035  2.984  2.965  5.016  37.1%  62.7% 
Difference          -46.0%***  -50.1%*** 
* significant at 10%  ** significant at 5%  *** significant at 1% 
 
Most interesting is the case when players faced scarcity: the average deviation 
from Nash moved from -0.4 to 0.5, reducing somehow the exacerbating behavior. As a 
proportion of Nash equilibrium, the average deviation changed from 9 percent above Nash 
to 13 percent below it, under low stock. 
These  results  imply  that  phenomenon  of  private  inefficient  over  exploitation  is 
corrected  when  management  strategies  (external  and  internal  regulation  and  joint 
management) are introduced in the game, which underlines the importance of institutions 
in the management and sustainability of a common pool resource. However, the deviations 
under scarcity that determines the collective or others-regarding behavior, continued being 34 
 




The results concerning to the hypothesis that under scarcity, individuals exacerbate the 
tragedy  of  the  commons  by  making  decisions  above  the  private  Nash  equilibrium  is 
formalized through a parametric analysis. 
  Our  hypotheses  are  that  individual  decision  about  extraction  (percent  deviation 
from  Nash)  is  explained  by  conditions  on  game  (current  round´s  stock  level,  group 
extraction and own extraction), the type of group every participant is playing with (Good 
groups, Nash groups, or Bad groups), demographic and socioeconomic conditions (age, 
education and income earnings), and perceptions about the protected area. In order to test 
these hypotheses, we conducted a survey to players, after game finished, to collect the 
needed  data  to  perform  an  econometric  analysis.  We  run  a  regression  of  individual 
deviations from Nash as a proportion of Nash equilibrium against several variables. Given 
that ten-round decisions for every individual are not independent, a panel data structure is 
adopted so that error associated to rounds within a particular player could be separated 
from  error  associated  to  the  between-individuals  variation.  As  the  model  uses  lagged 
variables, information about first round are dropped. Results are presented in Table 5. 
  To interpret the coefficients we follow a simple rule: positive coefficients imply that 
an increase in the independent variables will result in greater pro-social attitude by the 
player  and  vice  versa.  Conversely,  negative  coefficients  mean  that  an  increase  in  the 
independent variables will result in more private or even inefficient behavior.  
Main findings show that resource stock in current round demonstrates a positive 
relationship  with  relative  deviation.  It  implies  that  if  current  round  exhibits  abundance, 35 
 
current  individual  extraction  decision  will  have  a  greater  percent  deviation  from  Nash, 
moving towards the social optimum. On the other hand, every additional unit of individual 
extraction in previous round results in a downward deviation on current round, confirming 
that “bad guys” tended to keep being “bad” along the game. At the same time, the greater 
the extraction by the other members of the group in a previous round does not incite group 
mates to deviate down from Nash.  
 
Table 5. Panel regression to explain individual deviations from Nash.  
Dependent variable: Percent deviation from Nash  Coefficient  Std. Err. 
Resource stock current round (1 high, 0 low)  0.059*  0.032 
Own extraction previous round (1-8 units)  -0.056***  0.005 
Other members’ extraction previous round (4-32)  0.005*  0.003 
Belonging to bad group (1 bad group, 0 no bad group)  -0.294***  0.042 
Belonging to good group (1 good group, 0 no good group)  0.202***  0.043 
Age (years)  0.001*  0.001 
Education (years of education)  0.018***  0.003 
Per capita income (monthly minimum wages)  -0.168***  0.042 
Has received info about protected area (1 yes, 0 no)  0.068***  0.024 
Willingness to collaborate with park management (1 yes, 0 no)  0.074***  0.022 
Constant  -0.086 
ns  0.096 
Observations  2,164 
Groups  196 
R-sq within groups  0.142 
R-sq between groups  0.765 
R-sq overall  0.379 
Wald Chi-sq(k)  1,313 
* significant at 10%  ** significant at 5%  *** significant at 1%  
ns not significant 
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Two categorical variables are also used to capture intra group behavior: one of them 
takes the value of one if the group is categorized as a good group (in the sense above 
mentioned), the other one takes the value of one if the group is categorized as bad group. 
The coefficients are significant and the signs are the expected: being in a good group is 
associated  to  deviations  toward  the  social  optimum,  while  being  in  a  bad  group  is 
associated  with  deviations  downward  the  Nash  equilibrium.  Those  results  confirm  the 
conclusion that most of “good guys” pertained to “good” groups, as well as “bad guys” 
pertained to “bad” groups. 
  With respect to demographic variables is observed that age and education increase 
deviation from Nash, that is, older and more educated players tended to extract towards 
social optimum. 
  Per capita income shows a negative relationship with proportional deviations from 
Nash, implying that richer individuals extract closer to Nash equilibrium or above it. This 
result challenges the usual assumption that poorer people impact more heavily the natural 
resources, and also challenges the assumption about Malthusian over fishing. However, 
further analysis is needed as the correlation between bad guys and income has not been 
explored yet. 
Other two interesting variables are those related with the perception of players about 
the protected area and the meaning of conserving its resources. Players that declared to 
have received some information (training, workshops, etc.) about the importance of the 
protected area, or those that are willing to collaborate with environmental authorities in the 
management of the park, are more likely to deviate downward from Nash equilibriums. 
That  is,  they  are  more  interested  in  reducing  extraction  and  moving  toward  social 
solutions. 37 
 
Although these are very interesting results, this research is currently going on, so the 
results and analysis presented in this working paper are preliminary and further research is 
being performed around them. 
5  Conclusions 
 
Evidence  from  economic  experimental  games  performed  with  communities  from  the 
influence zone of the national natural park “Corales del Rosario y San Bernardo”, suggest 
that under scarcity the tragedy of the commons may be exacerbated, as individuals tend to 
over extract above the private Nash equilibrium in a “race to the bottom” that is not only 
inefficient privately but also inefficient socially and dangerous for the sustainability of a 
common pool resource. We found that in a situation of scarcity, players over extract the 
resource above the Nash equilibrium, obtaining less profits, mining the others-regarding 
interest, and exacerbating the tragedy of the commons. 
Those results imply, on one hand, that when scarcity appears either collective action is 
mined or forward lookingness by individuals is reduced, suggesting an increase in the inter 
temporal discount rate. One possible way to explain this behavior is what Pauly (1994) 
called Malthusian overfishing, observed when fishers are subject to rigidities in effort, few 
alternative sources of income and low standard of living; however, for our results there is 
no evidence that Malthusian overfishing becomes a full explanation of the phenomenon. 
Similar  to  previous  studies,  we  find  that  the  “distance”  from  the  theoretical  social 
optimum to the private Nash equilibrium is important in defining the chances of arriving to 
the  social  optimum.  Under  scarcity,  private  Nash  is  closer  to  the  social  optimum  and 
therefore, is more likely to observe individuals making decisions at that optimum. 
Although  there  is  a  tendency  to  over  extract  under  scarcity,  not  all  of  the  players 
behave in that way. Some players may have pro-social attitudes (“good guys”), some may 38 
 
have  individualistic  but  privately  efficient  attitudes  (“Nash  guys”),  and  some  may  have 
exacerbating attitudes, even if they are having economic losses by doing that (“bad guys”). 
Data shows that near 25 percent of players never made decisions above Nash equilibrium.  
Similarly,  there  are  groups  that  arrive  to  pro-social  outcomes,  while  others  do  the 
contrary.  That  is,  some  groups  consistently  behave  cooperatively  by  never  extracting 
above  Nash  (“good”  groups);  some  groups  exhibit  behaviors  closer  to  the  Nash 
equilibrium, and some groups repeatedly extract in an inefficient way (“bad” groups). 
Crossing individual and group behavior is observed that although good guys and good 
groups coincide most of the times, as well as bad groups and bad guys, about one quarter 
of players in groups that exacerbate the use of the resource are “good guys”, in the sense 
that they try consistently not to over extract the resource. As a result, they obtain low 
levels of profits and sustain gains of the others members of the group. 
On the contrary, seven percent of the players associated to “good” groups, consistently 
over extract during the game, even though the group keeps them in high stock availability 
obtaining  greater  profits.  They  are  free  riders  of  the  “good”  groups  that  maintain  high 
resource availability by efficient and pro-social decisions.  
When rules are included in the game, a significant part of the inefficient behavior is 
vanished.  That  result  highlights  the  importance  of  different  institutions  in  the  role  of 
managing the resources and controlling the threat of the tragedy the commons, or even 
worse, the exacerbation of this conduct. 
Preliminary  result  show  that  there  are  key  variables  affecting  the  decision  of  over 
extracting  a  resource:  i)  resource  abundance  induces  individuals  to  greater  deviation 
downward from Nash; ii) higher extraction in previous rounds are associated to consistent 
higher extraction in following rounds, confirming that “bad guys” tend to keep being “bad” 
players along the game.  39 
 
  Socio economic and demographic variables also may shape the pattern of over 
extraction: Older  and more  educated  players  tended  to  extract  at  levels  close  towards 
social  optimum.  Analysis  of  the  impact  of  income  challenges  the  assumption  that  the 
poorest  exert  more  damage  on  the  environment  leading  to  no  evidence  about  the 
hypothesis of Malthusian overfishing. However, statistics about income variable show that 
most of the players are under the poverty line and the variance among individuals is low. 
Variables associated to perceptions about the importance of the natural park show an 
important role in defining the decisions on use of the CPR: players that have received 
some training about the protected area and players that are interested in collaborating with 
the  management  of  the  protected  area  tend  more  to  deviate  downward  from  Nash 
equilibriums.  
These results, although highly interesting deserve further analysis. Lab experiments to 
check for differences between real fishers and college students might illustrate the nature 
of  some  of  the  decisions.  Different  designs  of  the  game may  enhance  the  information 
about decisions. 
Although  preliminary,  those  results  offer  much  information  to  propose management 
strategies for common pool resources and to understand behavior of individuals when they 
face scarcity of the resources, even beyond traditional rules as command and control, 
which are too frequent in protected areas but more and more times less efficient.   
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Annex 1. Pay-off tables  
 
Green pay-off table for HIGH resource availability and pink pay-off table for LOW resource 
availability 
 
 
 